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The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is a popular tool for measuring attitudes. We 
suggest that performing an IAT could, however, also change attitudes via analogical 
learning. For instance, when performing an IAT in which participants categorize 
(previously unknown) Chinese characters, flowers, positive words, and negative words, 
participants could infer that Chinese characters relate to flowers as negative words 
relate to positive words. This analogy would imply that Chinese characters are 
opposite to flowers in terms of valence and thus that they are negative. Results from 
three studies (N = 602) confirmed that evaluative learning can occur when 
completing an IAT, and suggest that this effect can be described as analogical. We 
discuss the implications of our findings for research on analogy and research on the 
IAT as a measure of attitudes.  
 
It seems safe to assume that psychological assessment likely adheres to 
Heisenberg’s observer effect in physics: by measuring, we perturb the system. This 
effect implies that the act of completing a psychological testing task simultaneously 
provides a training context for the organism. During the past two decades, the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT: Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) has become 
one of the most popular measurement tasks in psychology. Across three experiments, 
we examined a novel way in which the IAT might function as a training task. More 
specifically, we tested whether the IAT is an analogical evaluative learning task. 
The IAT has seen wide use as an implicit measure of attitudes in many 
domains of psychological research, including clinical, social, and experimental 
psychology (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). The task requires 
individuals to quickly categorize stimuli as belonging to four superordinate categories 
that are presented on screen (e.g., pictures of flowers, pictures of insects, positive 
words, and negative words). Two categories are mapped to each response option 
(e.g., left response = flowers or positive, right response = insects or negative). 
Importantly, this mapping changes across blocks (e.g., left response = flowers or 
negative, right response = insects or positive). Importantly, participants are often 
observed to exhibit an IAT effect, whereby they show faster responding in one block 
of categorizations relative to the other. For example, faster performance is typically 
observed when pictures of flowers and positive words are assigned to one key and 
pictures of insects and negative words to the second key compared to when flower 
and negative are assigned to one key and insects and positive to the second key. 
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Such differences in performance are assumed to reflect pre-existing differences in 
attitudes. 
Whereas the IAT has most frequently been employed as a testing task, 
variants of the task have also been employed as a training task. For example, Ebert, 
Steffens, Von Stülpnagel, and Jelenec (2009) demonstrated that completing an IAT-
like categorization task induced evaluative learning (see Prestwich, Perugini, 
Hurling, & Richetin, 2010, for a related task). In one study, participants were asked 
to categorize candy, chocolate, and valenced words. When candy was mapped to the 
same response key as positive words and chocolate was mapped to the same response 
key as negative words, participants later evaluated candy as more positive than 
chocolate, and vice versa. It has been argued that this form of learning is one 
instance of learning via intersecting regularities (Hughes, De Houwer, & Perugini, 
2016). Within the above example, the change in evaluation of candy versus chocolate 
was arguably driven by the intersection between the stimulus-response mappings 
that involve candy and positive (e.g., both required pressing a left key press) and 
those that involve chocolate and negative (e.g., both required a right key press). 
Such intersections have been shown to allow for a transfer of valence between the 
other members of the intersecting response mappings (Hughes et al., 2016). 
Importantly, however, research to date on the IAT as a training task has focused 
only on the effects of a single block of categorizations rather than the IAT as a 
whole.   
We suggest that the IAT as a whole can function as a training task by 
specifying two relations and allowing the individual to use one relation to inform the 
nature of the other. That is, we believe that it allows for learning via analogy.  In 
order to understand what we are proposing here, it is important to realize that the 
IAT always includes two pairs of concepts. By definition, analogies are defined by 
the relating of relations between two pairs of concepts (Holyoak & Koh, 1987). 
Specifically, analogical inferences can take place when there is one source relation 
and one target relation, and one of the concepts of the recipient relation is similar to 
one of the elements of the source relation. When these conditions are fulfilled, it 
becomes possible to form a link between the second element of the source relation 
and the second element of the recipient relation (Gentner & Smith, 2013). We argue 
that the IAT fulfils these requirements by including two pairs of categories. 
Notionally, the relations between the target stimuli pair (e.g., positive and negative, 
which are opposites) could be taken as being indicative of the relation between the 
category stimuli pair (e.g., a positive category such as flowers, and an unknown novel 
category, such as Chinese characters), allowing the individual to construct an 
analogy (e.g., Chinese characters:flowers::negative:positive). If so, it therefore should 
be possible to use the IAT to induce learning via analogy. This would have 
implications for the traditional use of the measure as a testing task within many 
clinical and social domains of psychology. Specifically, knowing whether, and to what 
 3 
degree, the IAT serves to establish or change the very attitudes it seeks to assess 
would seem to be an important caveat to the use of the IAT. It would also have 
implications for learning psychology research, by potentially providing a relatively 
subtle way to induce (evaluative) learning. 
 In three experiments, we assessed changes in liking due to the IAT. 
Participants evaluated neutral, unknown Chinese characters, completed a (training) 
IAT that differed between conditions, and then evaluated the characters a second 
time. The training IATs were based on the original flower-insects evaluation IATs 
(Greenwald et al., 1998). Each contained a novel stimulus target category (Chinese 
characters) as well as a valenced stimulus target category (either pictures of flowers 
or insects). Both tasks also employed positive and negative words as attribute 
stimuli. The flowers IAT therefore required participants to categorize Chinese 
characters, flowers, negative words, and positive words with response mappings that 
varied across the two blocks (e.g., press left for Chinese characters and negative and 
right for flowers and positive in one block versus press left for flowers and negative 
and right for Chinese characters and positive words in a second block). In contrast, 
the insects IAT required participants to categorize images of Chinese characters, 
images of insects, positive words, and negative words. Such IATs therefore share 
some similarities to those employed by Brendl, Markman and Messner (2001), who 
required participants to complete an IAT containing the categories insects, non-
words, positive words and negative words, and subsequently rating the non-words. 
However, in the absence of pre-IAT ratings or a comparison condition (e.g., a flowers 
IAT), it is not possible to know from Brendl et al.’s (2001) results whether ratings of 
the non-words were affected by the completion of the IAT. 
Importantly, previous research on learning via IAT-like categorization tasks 
have always involved only one of the IAT’s block types (e.g., Ebert et al., 2009; 
Prestwich et al., 2010) and would therefore likely not generalize to the full task. In 
contrast, our paradigm involves the full IAT including both block types. As such, 
this is the first study to our knowledge to examine the full IAT as a training task. 
Furthermore, by involving both block types, our task did not directly train 
participants on the relation between Chinese characters and one type of valence 
stimuli. Because of this, it is difficult to account for any observed effects in terms of 
learning via intersecting regularities, or indeed in terms of other well-known learning 
effect such as classical or operant conditioning, given that the Chinese characters 
contained an equal number of intersections with both positive and negative stimuli 
(see De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013). 
Learning could, however, result on the basis of an analogy between pairs of 
categories. For instance, in the flowers IAT, participants could infer that Chinese 
characters relate to flowers as negative words relate to positive words. This analogy 
would imply that Chinese characters are opposite to flowers in terms of valence and 
thus that they are negative. Participants in the insects IAT, on the other hand, 
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could infer that the Chinese characters are positive in valence. In sum, if the IAT 
can function as an analogical learning task, we expected more positive evaluations of 
the category “Chinese characters” when participants complete the insects IAT than 
when they complete the flowers IAT. For reasons that we will discuss at the end of 
this paper, observing these analogical learning effects would have interesting 
implications for both research on (learning via) analogy and research on the IAT as a 
measure of attitudes.  
Experiment 1 
All tasks were programmed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007) or Inquisit 
(Inquisit 4, 2015) and presented on-screen. All materials for both experiments, 
including measures and R code for data processing and analyses and the pre-
registration for Experiment 3 are available on the Open Science Framework 
(osf.io/t89fu). We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if 
any), all manipulations, and all measures in the study (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2012). 
Method 
Participants. Given the exploratory nature of the study, we recruited as 
many participants as possible within a pre-allocated data collection period of three 
weeks. Fifty-two students (37 women, 15 men, Mage = 22.06, SD = 3.46) at Ghent 
University were recruited and participated in the experiment in exchange for €5. All 
participants were fluent Dutch-speakers and provided written informed consent prior 
to participation. All instructions and tasks were provided in Dutch, although the 
English translations are reported here. 
Measures. Participants rated how much they liked each of the five Chinese 
characters and each of the five valenced images (flowers or insects, depending on 
condition). Each item employed a one (“not at all”) to five (“very much”) Likert 
scale.  
For both IATs, the task parameters employed were identical to the archetype 
described by Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2007). Nonetheless, we provide a brief 
description of the task parameters here. Before each block, participants were 
instructed that they would be presented with words and pictures in the middle of the 
screen, that they were to categorize these using the labels presented at the top left 
and top right of the screen. Participants were furthermore instructed that these 
labels were mapped onto the left and right response keys (E and I, respectively). 
Prior to each block, participants were also alerted to which categories would be 
presented on the next block. On each trial, participants were required to emit a 
correct response in order to advance to the next trial; accuracy feedback was 
delivered via a red X.  
Five images of each of flowers, insects, and different Chinese characters served 
as target stimuli. Five positive and five negative words served as attribute stimuli 
(attractive, enjoy, favourable, likeable, and lovely; awful, despise, dirty, disgust, and 
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nasty). Two IATs were created: the flowers IAT (flowers, Chinese characters, 
positive, negative) and the insects IAT (insects, Chinese characters, positive, 
negative).  
The length and content of each block was as follows (Nosek et al., 2007). 
Block 1: 20 attribute trials (i.e., positive and negative words); Block 2: 20 target 
trials (i.e., Chinese characters and either flowers or insects), Block 3: 20 target and 
attribute trials; Block 4: 40 target and attribute trials; Block 5: 40 attribute trials; 
Block 6: 20 target and attribute trials; and Block 7: 40 target and attribute trials. 
The location of the two target category labels reversed on Block 5, providing two 
contrasting categorization patterns across blocks. Comparisons were made between 
reaction times between stimulus presentation and correct response on Blocks 3 and 4 
versus those on Blocks 6 and 7. The order of presentation of the blocks was also 
counterbalanced between participants so that half of participants first encountered a 
block in which Chinese characters and positive words were categorized using the 
same response key, and half first encountered a Chinese characters-negative words 
block. 
Procedure. Participants were tested in individual experimental cubicles, and 
were randomly assigned to the flowers condition or insects condition. All instructions 
were presented on the computer screen. The experimental sequence was as follows. 
First, participants rated the five Chinese characters (time-point “pre”), followed by 
condition-appropriate valenced images (flowers or insects). Second, they completed 
either the flowers IAT or insects IAT. Finally, they rated the Chinese characters and 
the valenced images a second time (time-point “post”). 
Results  
Data processing and analysis. Differences in reaction times for each 
participant between the IATs’ two response patterns (i.e., block 3 vs. 6 and 4 vs. 7) 
were quantified using the D1 scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). 
These were coded so that positive scores refer to more positive automatic evaluations 
of the Chinese characters. No exclusions were made based on overall accuracy within 
the test blocks (M = 92.8%, SD = 4.6) or latency performances (M = 659ms, SD = 
92) in the test blocks (i.e., blocks 3, 4, 6 and 7). The ratings of the Chinese 
characters, flowers, and insects were each reduced to a mean score for each time-
point and change scores were then calculated. 
Given the directional nature of the manipulation checks and hypothesis we 
elected, a priori, to employ one-tailed comparisons in all t tests while retaining an 
alpha value of .05. Two manipulation checks were performed. First, our analysis 
relies on the assumption that the flowers stimuli would be rated as more positive 
than the insect stimuli. A Welch’s independent t-test indicated that participants 
rated the flowers stimuli as more positive than the insects stimuli, t(50) = 14.52, p 
< .001, d = 4.02, 95% CI [3.03, 5.03]. Second, our analysis relies on the assumption 
that that D1 scores on the flowers and insects IATs would differ as a function of 
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their valenced images. An independent t-test suggested that participants 
demonstrated larger D1 scores on the insects IAT than the flowers IAT, t(49.82) = -
2.24, p = .015, d = 0.62, 95% CI [0.03, 1.20].  
Most crucially, the change in liking of the Chinese characters due to the 
completion of the IAT was compared between groups using an independent t-test on 
the ratings change scores. This demonstrated significant differences of large effect 
size, t(46.26) = -3.14, p = .001, d = 0.87, 95% CI [0.27, 1.46]. Self-report ratings of 
the Chinese characters became more negative after the flowers IAT (Mchange = -0.29, 
SD = 0.53) whereas ratings became more positive after the insects IAT (Mchange = 
0.12, SD = 0.40)2. See Table 1 for summaries of the results of Experiments 1 and 2. 
See Figure 1 for plots of raw data, distributions, and inferential information. In sum, 
we observed an analogical learning effect.  
Prompted by reviewers’ comments, we used post hoc exploratory tests to 
examine whether the effect was influenced by the order in which participants 
completed the IAT blocks (i.e., IAT block order). An ANOVA with ratings change 
scores entered as DV and condition and block order entered as IVs did not reveal a 
significant interaction between condition and block order, F(1, 48) = 0.03, p = .95, 
η2 < 0.01.  
 
Table 1. Evaluations of the Chinese characters in Experiments 1 & 2. All analyses 
performed on difference scores before and after the IAT. 
 
 Mean (SD)   95% CI 
 Flowers condition 
Insects 
condition p d Low High 
Experiment 1       
Ratings -0.29 (0.53) 0.12 (0.40) .001 0.87 0.27 1.46 
Experiment 2       
Ratings -0.15 (0.72) 0.15 (0.74) .02 0.42 0.01 0.82 
SC-IATs -0.10 (0.35) 0.11 (0.33) .001 0.62 0.20 1.03 
 
                                                
2 All results were robust under the alternative strategy of employing an ANCOVA with post 
scores as DV and condition as IV with pre scores as a covariate. Experiment 1 ratings: F(1, 49) = 
11.19, p = .002, η2 = 0.12, 90% CI [0.05, 0.33]; Experiment 2 ratings:, F(1, 97) = 9.17, p = .003, η2 
=0.08, 90% CI [0.02, 0.18]; Experiment 2 SC-IATs, F(1, 97) = 6.18, p = .01, η2 =0.06, 90% CI [0.01, 
0.15]; combination analysis, F(1, 149) = 18.29, p = .00003, η2 = 0.09, 90% CI [0.04, 0.19]. 
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Figure 1. Change in evaluations of the Chinese characters. Pre-post change scores 
between the flowers IAT and insects IAT conditions across Experiments 1 and 2. 
Points represent individual participants’ change scores, curved lines represent 
Gaussian-smoothed kernel density estimations, black lines represent group means, 
and grey bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Experiment 2 
In a second experiment, we sought to replicate and extend the effects observed 
in Experiment 1 under more stringent conditions. Several changes were made to the 
design and methods in order to attempt to increase the strength of the conclusions 
that could be drawn. First, evaluations of the Chinese characters were also assessed 
using the Single Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT: Karpinski & Steinman, 
2006). The use of an implicit measure was intended to limit demand characteristics 
in the sample and to demonstrate that the evaluative learning effects have features 
of automaticity (e.g., can also be observed in a task that does not require the 
intention to evaluate the Chinese characters). The SC-IAT is a derivative of the IAT 
that includes only one target category (i.e., Chinese characters) and the two 
attribute categories (i.e., positive and negative). Second, the self-report ratings of the 
valenced images were taken at the end of the experiment rather than both before 
and after the IAT. In this manner, the only task in which the participants 
encountered the valenced images was the IAT, thus limiting the potential for 
unintended learning contexts within the procedure (e.g., tacit contrasting of the 
Chinese characters and valenced images within the rating scales). Third, in order to 
establish that the symbols were of unknown meaning, participants were asked if they 
understood any of the Chinese symbols at the start of the experiment. Finally, the 
ratings scales were changed from a 1 to 5 scale to a 1 to 7 scale to allow for greater 
variance. Similar to Experiment 1, it was hypothesized that the Chinese characters 
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would acquire the opposite valence to the target category that they were contrasted 
with in the IAT, on both the self-report and implicit measures. 
Method 
Participants. In contrast to Experiment 1, the sample size of N = 100 was 
determined by an a priori power analysis. This sample could be expected to provide 
sufficient power to detect change score groups differences of medium effect size 
(given α = .05, 1-β = .80, d = 0.5; N ≥ 98). 104 students (79 women and 25 men, 
Mage = 21.51, SD = 3.24) took part in exchange for €5. All participants were fluent 
Dutch-speakers and provided written informed consent prior to participation. Four 
participants provided only partial data and were excluded. 
Measures. Understanding of the Chinese characters was assessed using a 
single item that asked the participant whether they understood any or all characters 
using a yes/no response format. Similar to Experiment 1, participants rated the 
Chinese characters and the valenced images, this time using a 1-7 point scale. The 
IATs were identical to Experiment 1. The SC-IAT was employed to assess automatic 
evaluations of the Chinese characters in the absence of a valenced image contrast 
category. Similar to the IAT, the SC-IAT presented stimuli in the middle of the 
screen and required participants to categorize them in line with category labels that 
were presented at the top of the screen. These labels were mapped onto the left and 
right response keys (E and I). The SC-IATs consisted of 3 blocks. Participants first 
completed a practice block of 20 trials that presented the two attribute category 
stimuli only (i.e., positive and negative words) followed by two test blocks that 
presented both target (Chinese characters) and attribute stimuli (valenced words). 
Whereas the IAT typically presents equal numbers of trials for each stimulus 
categories on each test block, the SC-IAT presented an unequal number in order to 
roughly to balance the number of trials requiring left and right key responses while 
employing only three stimulus categories. Specifically, one test block presented 20 
Chinese characters trials, 20 positive words trials, and 30 negative words trials; the 
other test block presented 20 Chinese characters trials, 30 positive words trials, and 
20 negative words trials. Progression to the next trial was contingent on providing a 
correct response, and accuracy feedback was presented via a red X on incorrect 
trials. Brief explanatory instructions identical to the IAT were presented to the 
participant before each block. Block order presentation of both the IAT and SC-
IATs was counterbalanced between participants, as was the congruence between the 
IAT and SC-IAT block orders. 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in experimental cubicles, 
and were randomly assigned to the flowers condition or insects condition. All 
instructions were presented on the computer screen. The experimental sequence was 
as follows: participants completed the Chinese characters recognition scales, the SC-
IAT, and rated the Chinese characters (but not the valenced images). Time-point for 
this SC-IAT and rating scales was thus “pre” the IAT. Participants then completed 
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either the flowers IAT or insects IAT, and then the rating scales and SC-IAT a 
second time. Time-point for this SC-IAT and rating scales was thus “post” the IAT. 
Finally, each participant was asked to rate both the flowers and insects stimuli.  
Results  
All participants responded on the recognition test that they did not 
understand any of the Chinese characters. As such, no exclusions were made on the 
basis of this criterion. Identical to Experiment 1, ratings of the 5 exemplars of the 
characters, the images of flowers and the images of insects, respectively, were 
reduced to one mean score for each. Reaction times and accuracies on the IATs’ test 
blocks (i.e., blocks 3 vs. 6 and 4 vs. 7) were each transformed to a single D1 score for 
each participant. Responses on the SC-IATs’ test blocks (i.e., blocks 2 vs. 3) were 
also used to calculate a D1 score for each SC-IAT. Finally, change scores were 
calculated. Both the IAT and the SC-IATs were coded so that positive scores refer to 
more positive evaluations of the Chinese characters (i.e., IATs: Chinese characters-
positive/flowers-negative or Chinese characters-positive/insects-negative effects 
respectively; SC-IATs: Chinese characters-positive/negative effects). No exclusions 
were made based on accuracy (MSC-IATpre = 94.6%, SD = 3.6; MIAT = 93.5%, SD = 
4.9; MSC-IATpost = 92.9%, SD = 4.7) or latency performances (MSC-IATpre = 642ms, SD 
= 108; MIAT = 669ms, SD = 98; MSC-IATpost = 622ms, SD = 79) in the test blocks of 
either the IAT or SC-IATs. 
As in Experiment 1, given the directional nature of the manipulation checks 
and hypotheses we elected, a priori, to employ one-tailed comparisons in all tests 
(while retaining an α value of .05). Similar to Experiment 1, two manipulation checks 
were tested. A dependent t-test suggested that participants rated the flowers stimuli 
as more positive than the insects stimuli, t(99) = 26.91, p < .001, d = 4.08, 95% CI 
[3.59, 4.58]. An independent t-test demonstrated larger IAT D1 scores on the insects 
IAT than the flowers IAT, t(97.53) = - 4.11, p < .001, d = 0.82, 95% CI [0.40, 1.24].  
Changes in self-reported liking of the Chinese characters due to the 
completion of the IAT were compared between groups using an independent t-test on 
the ratings change scores. This demonstrated significant differences of medium effect 
size, t(97.70) = -2.07, p = .02, d = 0.42, 95% CI [0.01, 0.82]. Self-report ratings of 
the Chinese characters became more negative after the flowers IAT (Mchange = -0.15, 
SD = 0.72) whereas ratings became more positive after the insects IAT (Mchange = 
0.15, SD = 0.74).  
Differential changes in automatic evaluations of the Chinese characters due to 
the completion of the IAT between the two groups were assessed using an 
independent t-test on the SC-IAT change scores. This demonstrated significant 
differences of medium effect size, t(96.77) = -3.07, p = .001, d = 0.61, 95% CI [0.20, 
1.03]. Automatic evaluations of the Chinese characters on the SC-IATs became more 
negative after the flowers IAT (Mchange = -0.10, SD = 0.35) whereas ratings became 
more positive after the insects IAT (Mchange = 0.11, SD = 0.33).  
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Post hoc exploratory tests examined whether the effect was influenced by the 
order in which participants completed the IAT blocks (i.e., IAT block order). First, 
an ANOVA with ratings change scores entered as DV and condition and IAT block 
order entered as IVs did not reveal a significant interaction between condition and 
block order, F(1, 96) = 0.14, p = .71, η2 < 0.01. A second ANOVA was conducted 
with SCI-IAT change scores entered as DV and condition and IAT block order 
entered as IVs. Again, this did not demonstrate a significant interaction between 
condition and block order, F(1, 96) = 1.85, p = .18, η2 = 0.02.  
Experiment 3 
In a third experiment, we sought to explore the analogical nature of the IAT’s 
learning effect. If the effect were analogical, it would necessarily involve not only the 
Chinese characters and the valenced contrast category (flowers or insects) but also a 
second pair of stimuli, such as the attribute categories (e.g., positive and negative 
words). This experiment therefore manipulated the relation between the attribute 
categories in order to observe whether this undermined the IAT’s learning effect. 
Participants in a first condition completed an “opposite attributes” IAT that used 
positive and negative words as attribute stimuli, as in the previous experiments. This 
was intended to invite a relatively stronger analogy among the four categories: 
“Chinese characters:insects::positive:negative”. Participants in a second condition 
completed a “non-opposite attributes” IAT that employed non-words as attribute 
stimuli (e.g., Niffites vs. Luupites). This was intended to invite a relatively weaker 
analogy among the categories: “Chinese characters:insects::Niffites:Luupites”. Of 
course, any two categories of stimuli can be related as distinct from one another. In 
one sense, the IAT still required the participants to relate Niffites and Luupites as 
opposites by responding to them using opposite keys. However, it seems fair to say 
that the opposition between positive and negative is more extreme than that between 
Niffites and Luupites because the former is based not only on current task 
requirements (i.e., responding to them with opposite keys) but also a long learning 
history. Hence, if our effects are analogical in nature, the learning effect should be 
stronger in the former than in the latter condition. In order to increase the evidential 
weight of the data, the design, sample size, inclusion/exclusion criteria, and analytic 
strategy for this study was pre-registered. 
Method  
Participants. Sample size was determined a priori. Due to the difficult of 
estimating power for linear mixed-effects models, we employed a power analysis for a 
traditional fixed-effects ANOVA using G*power. Although not mutually 
substitutable, this provided a broad heuristic, and informed our decision to set 
sample size to ≥ 440 after exclusions3. As we expected a relatively small effect 
                                                
3 Parameters used in G*power: f = 0.25, alpha = .05, power = .95, numerator df = 1, groups 
= 4: suggested N ≥ 206. This suggested sample size was then doubled on the basis that our planned 
analytic strategy (i.e., multiple testing of the opposition category groups, first separately and then 
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between the opposite attributes and non-opposite attributes conditions, we employed 
a relatively large sample size. In contrast to the previous studies, we collected data 
online from the prolific.ac platform: 449 individuals (223 women, 222 men, and 4 
who identified as a third category, Mage = 34.90, SD = 11.45) took part in exchange 
for £0.90. All participants provided informed consent prior to participation. More 
stringent inclusion criteria were used relative to the previous experiments given the 
use of online data collection. Inclusion criteria were 90% approval rate in previous 
studies on the platform, age 18-65, English as a first language, and no participation 
in previous studies by our research group. Exclusion criteria were incomplete data, 
>10% of reaction times < 300ms on the IAT's test blocks (blocks 3, 4, 6, 7). 
Twenty-two individuals were excluded on this basis. Whereas the previous 
experiments also employed an accuracy exclusion criterion, none were applied in the 
current study on the basis that the non-opposite attributes IAT, which included non-
words, was of unknown difficulty relative to more typical IATs.  
Measures. Measures were highly similar to the previous experiment but were 
presented in English rather than Dutch. Two additional versions of the training IAT 
were created. These replaced the positive and negative attribute stimuli and their 
category labels with categories of non-words (Niffites: cellanif, eskannif, lebunnif, 
zallanif, otrannif, borrinif; vs. Luupites: meesolup, neenolup, omellup, wenalup, 
turralup, loomalup). These non-words have been employed as neutral stimuli in 
previous evaluative learning studies (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2015). 
Four versions of the IAT were therefore used in a 2X2 between-groups factorial 
design: (1) flowers IAT with opposite attributes, (2) insects IAT with opposite 
attributes, (3) flowers IAT with non-opposite attributes, and (4) insects IAT with 
non-opposite attributes. 
Procedure. Participants completed one random training IAT, followed by 
the Chinese characters SC-IAT and ratings scales. Unlike the previous experiments, 
participants were not asked to evaluate the stimuli before completing the IAT. This 
change was made on the basis of the idea that requiring participants to evaluate 
stimuli at multiple time-points might lead to artefactual learning effects under some 
circumstances (see Gawronski, Gast, & Houwer, 2015 for more details). The order of 
the SC-IAT and ratings scales was counterbalanced between participants, as was the 
SC-IAT block-order. Based on the results of the previous experiment, the congruence 
between the IAT block order and SC-IAT block order was not manipulated between 
participants (i.e., participants completed tasks in the same block order). 
Results  
Analytic strategy. We expected any evaluative learning effect to be small 
and therefore chose to employ a more powerful analytic strategy. While D scoring of 
                                                                                                                                                  
together) and to allow for an unknown attrition rate. Two preregistrations were made: the first 
incorrectly specified the sample size. This was corrected in a second preregistration. This was done 
during data collection before analyses had been conducted. 
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(SC-)IAT data is common, it reduces each individual’s performance on the task 
down to a single score. In contrast, by examining reaction time data directly, we 
were able to make use of all 140 reaction times provided by each participant’s SC-
IAT test blocks, thereby increasing power. Of course, this increase in power must be 
balanced with two functions usually accomplished with D scoring: (1) an 
acknowledgement of the non-independence of the multiple reaction times produced 
by each participant, and (2) controlling for differences in general responding speed 
between participants (Greenwald et al., 2003). Both points were addressed by using 
linear mixed-effects models, which allow for the modelling of both experimentally 
manipulated fixed-effects (e.g., SC-IAT block, IAT contrast category condition, IAT 
attribute condition) and also sources of unknown variation due to random effects 
(e.g., general responding speed; Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Bates, Mächler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2015). For the sake of clarity and simplicity only the results of 
effects that test specific hypotheses will be reported here. Details of other fixed main 
and interaction effects and random effects can be found in the supplementary 
materials on OSF. All steps in this analytic strategy were pre-registered, and any 
diverges from the pre-registration are noted or described as exploratory. In all 
models, confidence intervals and p values were approximated using the Wald 
method, which has been shown to be acceptable for larger samples such as ours 
(Luke, 2016).  
Data from the SC-IATs’ test blocks (i.e., blocks 3 vs. 4) was first processed to 
remove outliers and increase normality. Reaction times < 300 ms were trimmed and 
then reciprocally transformed to increase normality (Ratcliff, 1993; Whelan, 2008). It 
should be noted that reciprocal of reaction time can be referred to as “speed” (i.e., 
responses per second vs. seconds per response). Reciprocal transformations therefore 
have greater interpretability than other transformations (e.g., log). For example, 
participants may equally be described as having either “lower reaction times” or 
“higher speed” in one SC-IAT block relative to the other. Outliers were defined as 
>2.5 SD from the mean and excluded. 1.74% of data points were excluded on this 
basis. No transformations or exclusions were applied to the ratings data. Data were 
then submitted to a series of linear mixed-effects models.  
Automatic evaluations. We began by assessing whether the evaluative 
learning effect observed on the SC-IAT in the previous experiments was replicated. 
This was done using only data from the opposite attributes conditions. In the 
context of our mixed model, this referred to differences in responding speed being 
predicted by the interaction between the IAT conditions (whether Chinese characters 
were contrasted with flowers vs. insects) and the SC-IAT block (differences in 
responding speed between the SC-IAT blocks). In order to control for differences in 
general responding speed and acknowledge the non-independence of the reaction 
times generated by each participant, we included a random slope intercept for 
participant. Finally, in order to model differences in the magnitude of the SC-IAT 
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effect even between individuals in the same condition, we allowed for a random slope 
for SC-IAT block. The inclusion of this random slope, which is not directly required 
to test the hypotheses, made this a relatively conservative approach (Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). This model can be specified more precisely using Wilkinson 
notation: 
speed ∼ SCIATblock * IATcontrastCondition + (SCIATblock | participant) 
We first tested whether we could replicate the learning effect when using 
oppositional attribute categories (positive vs. negative). The presence of a learning 
effect was demonstrated by a significant two-way interaction between SC-IAT block 
and IAT contrast condition (B = 0.016, 95% CI = [0.007, 0.024], β = 0.034, 95% CI 
= [0.016, 0.052], p = .0003). Inspection of the estimated marginal means 
demonstrated that the effect was in the expected direction: when participants had 
previously completed the flowers IAT, they were faster (had higher speed) when 
categorizing Chinese characters using the same key as negative words (M = 1.71, 
95% CI = [1.67, 1.75]) relative to positive words (M = 1.69, 95% CI = [1.65, 1.72]); 
whereas, when they had previously completed the insects IAT, they were faster to 
categorize Chinese characters using the same key as positive words (M = 1.72, 95% 
CI = [1.68, 1.77]) relative to negative words (M = 1.69, 95% CI = [1.64, 1.73]). 
Results therefore suggest that the Chinese characters acquired the opposite valence 
to the images they were contrasted with in the IAT, thus replicating the evaluative 
learning effect found in the previous experiments.  
Next, we assessed whether the learning effect was present when employing 
non-word attribute stimuli. The same mixed model specification was employed as in 
the analysis of the condition with oppositional attribute stimuli. As expected, the 
interaction effect was non-significant (B = 0.005, 95% CI = [-0.003, 0.013], β = 
0.011, 95% CI = [-0.007, 0.029], p = .23). Inspection of the estimated marginal means 
demonstrated that participants responded with comparable speed in the two 
conditions (flowers IAT condition: Chinese characters-negative block, M = 1.69, 95% 
CI = [1.65, 1.73], Chinese characters-positive block, M = 1.68, 95% CI = [1.64, 1.72]; 
insects IAT condition: Chinese characters-negative block, M = 1.67, 95% CI = [1.63, 
1.7], Chinese characters-positive block, M = 1.67, 95% CI = [1.63, 1.71]). Results 
therefore provide no evidence for the evaluative learning effect when the IAT’s 
structural analogy was undermined.  
The previous analyses suggest that there was evidence for the effect in the 
opposite attributes condition and no evidence for the effect in the non-opposites 
condition. However, in order to directly test whether the evaluative learning effect is 
undermined when attribute stimuli were non-opposites relative to opposites, these 
two conditions should be directly compared. A third model was created using data 
from both the IAT attribute conditions and entering this condition into the model:  
speed ∼ SCIATblock * IATcontrastCondition * IATattributeConditions + 
(SCIATblock | participant) 
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We observed a marginally significant three-way interaction between SC-IAT 
block, IAT contrast condition, and IAT attributes condition (B = -0.005, 95% CI = 
[-0.011, 0.001], β = -0.012, 95% CI = [-0.024, 0.001], p = .07). Inspection of the 
marginal means (above) indicated that this effect was in the expected direction (see 
Figure 2 for estimated marginal means). We also constructed an additional, but not 
pre-registered, exploratory model that was less conservative in that it removed the 
random slope for SC-IAT block. This model therefore assessed differences in the SC-
IAT effect between conditions, but did not attempt to also model differences in the 
SC-IAT effect at the individual level. Using this model, a significant three-way 
interaction effect was found (B = -0.005, 95% CI = [-0.009, -0.002], β = -0.012, 95% 
CI = [-0.019, -0.005], p = .001).4  
Based on a reviewer suggestion, we calculated SC-IAT D1 scores (see Table 2 
for descriptive statistics) and Bayesian analysis was used to allow us to quantify the 
evidence for the null hypothesis. We compared a fixed-effects ANOVA on D1 scores 
with a Bayesian equivalent of the above mixed-effects analysis on transformed 
reaction time data, both of which were conducted using the R package brms 
(Bürkner, 2017). A default prior was employed on scaled and centred data (normal 
distribution with M = 0, SD = 1: Gelman, Lee, & Guo, 2015). Results from the 
fixed-effects ANOVA on SC-IAT D1 scores provided no credible evidence in favour 
of either the null or alternative hypotheses for the interaction between IAT contrast 
condition and attribute condition (β = 0.25, 95% HDI = [-0.12, 0.62], BF10 = 0.47). 
However, results from the mixed-effects model on reciprocally transformed reaction 
time data provided moderate evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis (β = 
0.10, 95% HDI = [0.04, 0.15], BF10 = 4.49). Both results were robust to the use of a 
wider prior (i.e., normal distribution with M = 0, SD = √2; fixed-effects analysis: β = 
0.25, 95% HDI = [-0.10, 0.60], BF10 = 0.68; mixed-effects analysis: β = 0.10, 95% 
HDI = [0.04, 0.15], BF10 = 4.96). While the results from these two analytic strategies 
might at first seem to be at odds with one another, it is worth recalling that Bayes 
Factors are contingent on the data at hand. When using D1 scoring, given fewer 
data points and a small effect size, the key interaction term was of uncertain utility 
in characterising the data. In contrast, when all 140 data points from each 
participant were modelled, given a far greater number of data points, the best 
characterisation of the data included the key interaction term. These findings were 
therefore consistent with our pre-registered decision to employ mixed-effects models 
rather than D1 scores, given our sample size choices and expectations that the size of 
the effect would be relatively small. On the basis that the more powerful analytic 
                                                
4 We also examined the influence of IAT block-order for Experiment 3. Although we did find 
evidence for an effect of IAT block-order, we do not report the analyses here because IAT and SC-
IAT block order were not manipulated independently in Experiment 3. Hence, no strong conclusions 
can be made regarding whether the effect of IAT block-order is actually due to IAT block-order or to 
SC-IAT block order. 
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strategy suggested that the inclusion of the key interaction term provided the better 
characterisation of the data, we concluded that the data was supportive of our 
hypothesis that the learning effect was analogical in nature. 
 
Table 2. Evaluations of the Chinese characters in Experiment 3.  
 
 Mean (SD) 
IAT contrast category IAT attribute stimuli Ratings SC-IAT D1 
Flowers Non-opposites 4.24 (0.77) -0.04 (0.29) 
Insects Non-opposites 4.39 (0.88) 0.01 (0.27) 
Flowers Opposites 4.23 (0.88) -0.05 (0.27) 
Insects Opposites 4.42 (0.83) 0.07 (0.26) 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for mean ratings and SC-IAT D1 scores are provided for 
reader familiarity. 
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated marginal means of response speed on the SC-IAT blocks 
between conditions in Experiment 3. 
 
Self-reported evaluations. A comparable set of models was used to assess 
the same hypotheses within the self-report ratings. These each included a random 
intercept for participant to acknowledge the non-independence of the multiple 
ratings produced by each participant. In the opposite attributes IAT conditions, we 
did not observe a significant main effect for IAT contrast condition (B = -0.097, 95% 
CI = [-0.215, 0.022], β = -0.088, 95% CI = [-0.196, 0.020], p = .11). Participants 
rated the Chinese characters similarly whether they previously completed the flowers 
IAT (M = 4.23, 95% CI = [4.07, 4.39]) or insects IAT (M = 4.42, 95% CI = [4.25, 
4.59]). Results therefore do not replicate those found in the previous experiments: no 
evaluative learning effect was found on the self-report measures. An analysis of data 
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from the non-opposite attributes conditions also did not reveal evidence that ratings 
differed between the IAT contrast category conditions (B = -0.075, 95% CI = [-
0.184, 0.033], β = -0.068, 95% CI = [-0.166, 0.030], p = .17). Participants rated the 
Chinese characters similarly regardless of whether they previously completed the 
flowers IAT (M = 4.24, 95% CI = [4.08, 4.4]) or insects IAT (M = 4.39, 95% CI = 
[4.24, 4.54]). A direct comparison of the learning effect in both attribute conditions 
did not provide evidence for a difference in the effect in between conditions (B = 
0.011, 95% CI = [-0.069, 0.091], β = -0.010, 95% CI = [-0.063, 0.082], p = .79).  
Similar to the analysis of SC-IAT data, based on reviewer suggestions we 
calculated mean ratings for each participant (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics) 
and compared Bayes Factors between a fixed-effects ANOVA on mean ratings data 
with a mixed-effects analysis on the individual ratings. Results from both provided 
moderate evidence in favour of the null hypotheses for the interaction between IAT 
contrast condition and attribute condition (fixed-effects analysis: β = 0.05, 95% HDI 
= [-0.32, -0.42], BF10 = 0.20; mixed-effects analysis: β = 0.04, 95% HDI = [-0.25, 
0.32], BF10 = 0.15). Results from the fixed-effects analysis were not robust to the use 
of a wider prior (β = 0.05, 95% HDI = [-0.26, 0.35], BF10 = 0.68), whereas the 
mixed-effects analysis was robust (β = 0.04, 95% HDI = [-0.24, 0.31], BF10 = 0.20). 
Similar to the analysis of the SC-IAT data, given the greater power of the mixed-
model analysis we therefore concluded that there was evidence against the presence 
of an evaluative learning effect in Experiment 3. 
General discussion 
Results from three experiments demonstrate that the IAT functions as an 
evaluative learning context and does so in a previously unappreciated manner. 
Changes in liking of the Chinese characters as a result of being contrasted with 
valenced images in the IAT were observed in all three experiments. This effect was 
found on both self-report ratings (Experiments 1 and 2, but not Experiment 3) and 
an implicit measure (Experiments 2 and 3, no implicit measure included in 
Experiment 1). Importantly, and in line with the hypotheses, the Chinese characters 
acquired the opposite valence to that of the target category they were contrasted 
with in the IATs. 
The analogical nature of the effect 
All three experiments provide evidence for an evaluative learning effect, with 
consistent results on the implicit measures and more mixed results on the self-report 
measures. However, the nature of the effect requires consideration. Importantly, the 
procedural set-up of the IAT, and the fact that the Chinese characters acquired the 
opposite rather than same valence to the stimulus they were contrasted with makes 
the effect very difficult to explain as an instance of learning via established 
environmental regularities, such as stimulus pairing or intersecting regularities (De 
Houwer et al., 2013; Hughes et al., 2016). For example, the effect does not qualify as 
an instance of intersecting contingencies given that the contingencies involving 
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Chinese characters (a) intersected an equal number of times with contingencies 
involving the positive and negative attribute stimuli, and (b) never intersected with 
the contingencies involving the valenced images (flowers or insects).  
As pointed out by the reviewers, it could be the case that one block of 
intersections (i.e., one IAT block) had more impact on the learning effect than the 
other. For instance, the consistent block in which flowers were assigned to the same 
key as positive stimuli might have had more impact than the inconsistent block in 
which flowers were assigned to the same key as negative stimuli. The reviewers noted 
that this selective impact of the consistent block might be particularly likely if 
participants complete this block before the inconsistent block because block order is 
known to affect ease of performance (i.e., the advantage for the consistent over 
inconsistent block is bigger when the consistent block comes first). Exploratory 
analyses of our data, however, provided little evidence for effects of IAT block order. 
Also note that a bigger impact of the consistent IAT blocks does not exclude an 
explanation in terms of analogical learning. For instance, it is possible that consistent 
blocks are more likely to lead to the construction of an analogy (e.g., Chinese 
characters:negative::flowers:positive vs. Chinese characters:positive::flowers:negative). 
However, this would still imply the involvement of analogical processes. Nevertheless, 
more research is needed to examine the extent to which IAT blocks contribute 
differentially to the learning effects that we observed.  
In the absence of an explanation for the learning effect in terms of established 
regularities, Experiment 3 sought to provide support for the analogical nature of the 
effect. If the effect is best described as analogical, it would necessarily involve not 
only the Chinese characters and the valenced images, but also (a) a second pair of 
stimuli and (b) the relating of relations among these two pairs (Gentner & Smith, 
2013). Within the context of the IAT, the Chinese characters and valenced contrast 
category (flowers or insects) could notionally form the target pair, and the attribute 
categories (positive vs. negative words) could form a source pair. If the effect were 
analogical, the relation between the source pair (the attribute categories) would serve 
to cue the relation between the target pair (the neutral category and valenced 
contrast category). That is, the fact that the attribute words are a pair of opposites 
may signal that the Chinese characters are also opposite to the contrast category 
(e.g., Chinese characters:insects::positive:negative). Experiment 3 therefore 
manipulated the nature of the relation between the attribute categories between 
groups in order to test whether this influenced the learning effect. Results provide 
evidence for the learning effect in the condition that employed opposite attributes 
(positive vs. negative words), whereas no evidence was found for the learning effect 
in the condition that employed non-opposite attribute stimuli (non-words: Niffites vs. 
Luupites). The difference between these two conditions was marginally significant in 
the more conservative, pre-registered linear mixed-effects model, although it should 
be noted that it was highly significant in a less conservative, exploratory model that 
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relaxed the assumptions about the random effect. Results from a comparable 
Bayesian analysis were congruent with this conclusion, as discussed in Experiment 
3’s results section. Because the effect appeared to be influenced by the relation 
among the attribute stimuli even when the Chinese characters and contrast category 
were kept constant, we conclude that there is at least initial evidence that the IAT’s 
learning effect can be characterized as being analogical. This has several implications 
for both learning research and for the use of the IAT, which will be discussed further 
below. 
While our results refer specifically to learning via the IAT, it is likely that 
other tasks might induce a comparable effect. For example, Scherer and Lambert 
(2009) demonstrated that relatively neutral images presented within an evaluative 
priming task are evaluated within the task as either positive or negative depending 
on whether they are presented alongside positively or negatively valenced images. It 
should be pointed out that Scherer and Lambert’s results are not necessarily learning 
effects, because no assessment was made of whether the valence changes during the 
task were observed to change behaviour following the task. Furthermore, it is equally 
possible that the effects observed by Scherer and Lambert are also instances of an 
analogical effect like that described here. Like the IAT, the evaluative priming task 
includes not only the neutral and valenced stimulus categories, but also a second pair 
or valenced attribute categories. This hypothesis could be investigated in a similar 
manner as in Experiment 3 within the current article that is, by manipulating the 
relation among the attribute categories. Future research might therefore wish to 
explore whether other tasks, such as evaluative priming, also demonstrate contain 
structural analogies and can be used to demonstrate analogical learning effects (see 
also Spellman, Holyoak, & Morrison, 2001).  
Implications for learning 
Results are of interest to learning psychology, as they demonstrate that IAT 
may have utility as a task for inducing learning via analogy. Importantly, research to 
date on analogy has predominantly focused on the mechanisms of analogical 
reasoning (e.g., the ability to generate a correct answer given an incomplete analogy: 
Gentner, 1989; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989) and on how analogical abilities are 
involved in the development of language (Christie & Gentner, 2014; Gentner & 
Christie, 2008; Gentner & Namy, 2006). However, relatively less work has focused on 
learning via analogy, when learning is defined as a change in behaviour due to 
regularities in the environment (De Houwer et al., 2013; although see Bliznashki & 
Kokinov, 2009; Gentner & Smith, 2013; Ruiz & Luciano, 2011; Stewart, Barnes-
Holmes, Hayes, & Lipkens, 2001). This is surprising given that several authors have 
argued that analogy is central to human adaptability to our environment and our 
ability to learn about events we have not directly experienced (e.g., Gentner, 2003; 
Hofstadter, 2001; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). We therefore suggest that there is a 
need to directly examine learning about novel concepts via such analogical abilities, 
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including study of the environmental regularities that determine when analogical 
learning takes place. We suggest that this concept of learning via analogy may have 
both explanatory and predictive utility. For example, while our observed effects here 
are not easily interpreted as being due to established environmental regularities, such 
as stimulus pairing, operant learning, or intersecting regularities (Hughes et al., 
2016), they are readily accommodated as instances of learning via analogy. 
Furthermore, the concept of learning via analogy allows for future predictions about 
how to arrange the environment to produce such learning. Learning psychology and 
behaviour change research may therefore benefit from closer consideration of learning 
via analogy (see also De Houwer, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2016). In a broader 
sense, this may contribute to efforts to bridge our understanding of (evaluative) 
learning and attitude change between traditionally disparate fields of study, such as 
evaluative conditioning, instructional control, and persuasion (De Houwer & Hughes, 
2016). 
It is also worth noting that analogy research to date most frequently has used 
explicit tasks, insofar as participants are explicitly asked to select logically correct 
responses in order to complete analogies. These include, for example, analogy 
completion tasks (e.g., “start:finish::far:[near, away, travel, farther]”, Sternberg & 
Nigro, 1980) and relational matching-to-sample tasks (e.g., where individuals can 
respond to the compound stimulus “square-square” [same] with the compound 
stimulus “triangle-triangle” [same] or “circle-star” [different]; Christie & Gentner, 
2014; Premack, 1983). Our use of the IAT here, in contrast, is a relatively subtle way 
of arranging the environment so as to allow the participant themselves to construct 
and employ analogies by making analogical responding task-irrelevant. It may be the 
case that this induces less reactance in participants (i.e., resistance against the 
experimental manipulation: Fulcher & Hammerl, 2005) than explicit instructions to 
learn via analogy. This property of making analogical responding a task-irrelevant 
goal within the IAT may therefore allow for several new areas of research, such as 
research into the automaticity of learning via analogy or the automaticity of the 
deployment of analogical abilities. It should be noted, however, that the structure of 
the IAT (i.e., pairs of oppositely related categories) likely makes it more amenable to 
establishing learning via analogies involving equivalence and opposition. Future research 
might explore whether analogical learning that involves other relations can also be 
established using IAT-like tasks. 
Implications for the IAT 
 In line with Heisenberg’s observer effect in physics, our results suggest that 
the act of completing an IAT to some extent establishes or changes the attitudes 
that it is intended to assess. This may have important implications for its use as a 
measure of implicit attitudes: consider a race IAT in which participants categorizes 
faces of Black people, White people, positive words, and negative words (e.g., 
Greenwald et al., 1998, 2009). Existing research suggests that completing such an 
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IAT may influence subsequent behaviour towards racial out-groups (Vorauer, 2012), 
but has not provided a precise account of how the IAT induces learning, and 
therefore how this effect could be enhanced or mitigated. The current results suggest 
that, for example, if prior to completing a race IAT a white individual possessed (a) 
strong automatic positive evaluations of white people but (b) no particularly strong 
automatic evaluations of black people, the act of completing the IAT may serve to 
establish the analogy that “black people are to white people as negative is to 
positive” (i.e., two pairs of opposites). Such an individual might subsequently 
evaluate black people more negatively after completing the task. Future research 
should therefore examine whether analogical learning within the IAT biases its 
outcome, or even changes the established attitudes it intends to assess. For example, 
one could test whether completion of a race IAT serve to increase racial bias, and 
how lasting any such changes may be (cf. Lai et al., 2016). 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Given the procedural similarity between the IAT and SC-IAT, the use of a 
SC-IAT as an outcome measure in Experiments 2 and 3 may have influenced the 
observed learning effects in some way. Future research may therefore wish to employ 
an assessment task whose procedural properties are more distinct from the IAT, such 
as evaluative priming (e.g., Spruyt & Tibboel, 2015) or the Affective Misattribution 
Procedure (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Future research might also 
address whether consistent and inconsistent IAT blocks differentially contribute to 
the learning effects (i.e., the influence of IAT block order). Effects were observed on 
the implicit measure across studies, including those that did and did not require the 
Chinese characters to be rated prior to completing the IAT. As such, this provides 
some confidence that the learning effects are not merely an artefact of pre-rating or a 
demand compliance effect. Nonetheless, future work is needed to examine the 
possibility that the absence of the pre-ratings in Experiment 3 was responsible for 
the elimination of the learning effect on the self-report measures in that experiment. 
Conclusion 
 Results from three experiments demonstrated that the IAT functions as a 
training task as well as a testing task, and does so in a previously unrecognized 
manner. More specifically, results suggest that the IAT can function as an analogical 
learning task. Our results reveal new avenues for research on both learning via 
analogy and the IAT as a measure of attitudes.  
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